Dynamic problems of pollution and resource management with stock externalities often require a di¤erential games framework of analysis. In addition they are represented realistically by non linear transition equations. However, feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) 1 solutions, which are the desired ones in this case, are di¢ cult to obtain in problems with non linear-quadratic structure. We develop a method to obtain numerically non linear FBNE for a class of such problems, with a speci…c example for shallow lake pollution control.
Introduction
Many pollution control models have a similar format. Emissions as a byproduct of production or consumption accumulate into a stock of pollutants, which is damaging in some way. Production of energy with fossil fuels, for example, releases CO 2 and this contributes to the stock of greenhouse gases, which may cause damage through climate change. To take another example, agricultural activities release phosphorus into lakes, and the resulting stock of phosphorus causes a loss of ecological services, provided by these lakes.
Resource extraction problems also have a similar format, if the stock of the resource has some direct utility besides the option to extract in the future.
For example, a forest may have an amenity or a biodiversity value besides the option to extract wood. Another important characteristic of these problems 2 is that the damage usually is a public bad. This implies that the optimal control models, that can be set-up to handle the trade-o¤s above, have stock externalities, which turns the framework of analysis into a di¤erential game.
The techniques developed in this paper apply to this general class of problems but in order to keep the presentation transparent, the paper focuses on pollution control problems and, more speci…cally, on the eutrophication of lakes.
Di¤erential games have been extensively studied during the recent decades to analyse economic problems in areas such as industrial organization, resource and environmental economics or macroeconomic policy. The solution concept that is most often used is the open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE), where controls only depend on time (and the initial state of the system).
As it is well known, the OLNE is weakly time-consistent but not strongly time-consistent (Başar, 1989) : it does not possess the Markov perfect property and is not robust against unexpected changes in the state of the system. Therefore, the feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) is a more satisfactory solution concept. It is derived in a dynamic programming framework, so that controls depend on time and state and the solution is Markov perfect by construction. However, solutions are usually very di¢ cult to derive. It is straightforward to …nd linear feedback equilibria for problems with linear dynamic systems and quadratic objectives, but two types of possible nonlinearities complicate matters considerably. The …rst one is the possibility of strategic non-linearities. Tsutsui and Mino (1990) have shown that nonlinear equilibria may exist for a linear-quadratic formulation of the dynamic duopoly with sticky prices and their result has later been applied to other 3 problems, such as the problem of international pollution control (Dockner and Long, 1993) . The second one is the possibility of system non-linearities.
Recent advances in environmental and resource economics emphasize the need for a realistic representation of the ecological system. Realistic modeling of natural systems in most cases indicates that the use of linear dynamics for these natural processes in uni…ed economic-ecological models might not be a good approximation. Non-linearities in the transition equations mainly relate to the existence of non-linear feedbacks, which are physical processes that further impact an initial change of the system under investigation. Feedbacks could be positive if the impact is such that the initial perturbation is enhanced, or negative if the initial perturbation is reduced. For example, in the study of climate change a positive feedback occurs when a higher temperature, due to increased accumulation of greenhouse gases, causes evaporation from the oceans which enhances the greenhouse e¤ects. To take another example, in the analysis of eutrophication of lakes, positive feedbacks are related to the release of phosphorus that has been slowly accumulated in sediments and submerged vegetation. Ignoring these non-linearities might obscure very important characteristics that we observe in reality such as bifurcations and irreversibilities or hysteresis. As a consequence. the design of policies that do not take the impact of non-linearities into account might lead to erroneous results and non-desirable states of the ecosystem. Note that the term feedback both refers to physical processes that yield non-linearities in the dynamics of the system and to strategies of economic agents that depend on the state of the system. This paper shows how to derive the set of (non-linear) feedback Nash equilibria for di¤erential games with non-linear feedbacks in the state transition. It will be clear that the solution cannot be derived analytically but that a numerical approach is needed. This approach is valid for a general class of symmetric non-linear di¤erential games, but the paper will focus on the well-known model for the eutrophication of (shallow) lakes. The basic idea is that the dynamic programming equations can be rewritten as an ordinary di¤erential equation in the feedback control of the economic agents. This proves to be an Abel di¤erential equation and the paper presents an algorithm to solve it. The boundary condition is free which implies the multiplicity of feedback Nash equilibria. The boundary condition can be linked to the resulting steady state, so that the set of feedback Nash equilibria can be parametrized by the feasible steady states.
The results allow us to assess the e¢ ciency of the di¤erent Nash equilibria.
It is interesting to start with the steady states and to compare this with the literature on international pollution control, a linear-quadratic problem. This literature developed in three steps. First, van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) derived the linear feedback Nash equilibrium and showed that the steady state lies further away from the optimal management steady state than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Dockner and Long (1993) characterized the non-linear feedback Nash equilibria for this problem and showed that the optimal management steady state can be approximated by a feedback Nash equilibrium steady state, for small enough discount rates. Rubio and Casino (2002) shown in this paper that the value of the best feedback Nash equilibrium is generally worse than the value of the open-loop Nash equilibrium, and therefore a fortiori worse than the value under optimal management.
A Class of Non-Linear Di¤erential Games in Pollution Control
Consider a situation where n economic agents take actions a i , i = 1; 2; :::; n, at each point in time t, with which they a¤ect the state of a natural system, that is shared by all the agents. The actions could, for example, be emissions of greenhouse gases due to industrial activities, or phosphorus loadings into a lake due to agricultural activities. The economic agents in these cases are countries, concerned about climate change, or communities, concerned about the eutrophication of a lake that they share. The action a i generates bene…ts according to a strictly increasing and concace utility function U (a i ), which is assumed to be the same for all agents. The evolution of pollutant in the natural system is described by the non-linear transition equation
The state variable x could be interpreted, for example, as accumulated greenhouse gases or accumulated phosphorus in a lake. Besides the standard linear degradation term bx, non-linear feedbacks occur that are represented by the function f (x), which is an increasing non-linear function of the state variable
x. In the application that follows, the function f (x) is a convex-concave function with a switching point in between, where f 0 (x) is maximal. The stock of pollutants x causes environmental damage (or equivalently, reduces the ‡ow of useful services generated by the natural system) according to a strictly increasing and convex damage function D(x), which is also assumed to be the same for all agents. It follows that the ‡ow of net bene…ts accruing to each agent at each point in time is given by U (a i (t)) D(x(t)). Each agent is choosing a strategy a i (at this point assumed to be only a function of time)
in order to maximize the present value of net bene…ts over an in…nite time horizon, or
]dt; i = 1; 2; :::; n;
subject to (1), where > 0 is a discount rate, common for all agents.
The game aspect is standard: all actions add to the public bad, so that each agent generates a negative externality for the other agents. Optimal management requires to choose the set of strategies {a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n } in order to maximize the sum of individual net bene…ts, or max fa 1 (:);:::an(:)g
subject to (1). The current-value Hamiltonian H for this problem is given
and Pontryagin's maximum principle yields the necessary conditions U 0 (a i ) + = 0; i = 1; 2; :::; n;
with transversality conditions lim t!1 e t (t) = 0, lim t!1 e t (t)x(t) = 0.
Solving (5) for a i , and substituting the result in equation (6) It is convenient, for demonstrating the results later, to rewrite this into the MHDS in the state-control space (x; a). Di¤erentiating equation (5) with respect to time, and substituting the result and (5) in equation (7) leads to
This equation simpli…es considerably if it assumed that the utility function U has a constant elasticity of marginal utility equal to 1, so that U (a i ) = ln a i .
Equation (8) reduces to
Because of symmetry, multiplication with n yields
Equations (6) and (10) form the MHDS in the state-control space (x; a), where a denotes the total action of all the agents together. As it is shown in Brock and Starrett (2003) , under the assumptions made on the U (a i ), D(x) and f (x) functions, this MHDS has an odd number of steady states.
The …rst and the last steady state are locally stable.The locally stable steady states have the saddle-point property, with a one-dimensional globally stable manifold, and the locally unstable steady states, with possibly complex eigenvalues, lie between two locally stable steady states.
It is straightforward to derive the open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) of this game by applying Pontryagin's maximum principle to the individual optimal control problems (2). This leads to the following simple modi…cations in the necessary conditions U 0 (a i ) + i = 0; i = 1; 2; :::; n;
where i denotes the costate of the optimal control problem for agent i. The same manipulations as above …nally yield the MHDS in the state-control space (x; a), consisting of equation ( 6) and
In order to demonstrate the results, it is convenient to specify the functions D(x) and f (x). It is assumed that the damage function has a simple quadratic form: D(x) = cx 2 . The parameter c can be interpreted as the relative importance the agent attaches to the environmental damage in relation to the utility of the action that causes the damage. The function f (x) represents the internal feedbacks in the natural system. Many natural systems have been carefully investigated and therefore f (x) will be chosen according to the speci…cation that has a good …t to the observations of one of these natural systems, namely the shallow lake.
The Shallow Lake
Shallow lakes have been intensively studied over the last two decades and it has been shown that the essential dynamics of the eutrophication process can be modelled by the di¤ererential equation
where P is the amount of phosphorus sequestered in algae, L is the input of phosphorus (the "loading"), s is the rate of loss consisting of sedimentation, out ‡ow and sequestration in other biomass, r is the maximum rate of internal loading and m is the anoxic level (see for an extensive treatment of the lake model Carpenter and Cottingham, 1997, or Sche¤er, 1997 , equation (15) can be rewritten as
The parameter b can vary considerably across lakes. It indicates whether the dynamics of the lake has bifurcations with hysteresis e¤ects or irreversibilities. By comparing equation (16) with equation (1), it can be seen that the shallow lake model is an example of a natural system with internal feedbacks, where the non-linear convex-concave function f (x) is speci…ed as
. If the lake is shared by a number of communities, say n, that develop agricultural activities around the lake, the loading of phosphorus a is the total loading of these communities: a = P n i=1 a i . Mäler, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (2003) present and compare the optimal management solution and the open-loop Nash equilibrium for the shallow lake. With the speci…cations for the functions D(x) and f (x), the general analysis above immediately provides the MHDS for these two outcomes, consisting of equation (16) and
for optimal management and
for the open-loop Nash equilibrium. The parameter b is …xed at b = 0:6 (the hysteresis case) and the discount rate is …xed at = 0:03. If the parameter c is high enough (e.g. c = 1), the MHDS for optimal management has one saddle-point stable steady state in the so-called oligotrophic region (low levels of pollution). However, the open-loop Nash equilibrium with two communities has in this case two saddle-point stable steady states (with an unstable steady state in between): one in the oligotrophic region and one in the eutrophic region (high levels of pollution). Note that the two-player problem is equivalent to the optimal management problem with the parameter c divided by two. A Skiba point exists which means that for low initial levels of pollution it is best to follow Nash equilbrium strategies towards the oligotrophic steady state, but for high initial levels of pollution it is best to follow Nash equilibrium strategies towards the eutrophic steady state. Insert Figures 1 and 2 here.
These outcomes are important benchmarks for the feedback Nash equilibria that are derived in the next section.
Feedback Nash Equilibria
The feedback Nash equilibria (FBNE) for the class of non-linear di¤eren-tial games, speci…ed in Section 2, result from solving the dynamic programming or Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations in the value functions V i . The functions and parameters in the problem formulation (2) do not directly depend on time, so that the problem is stationary. Therefore the equilibrium strategies can be represented in a time-stationary feedback form a i = h i (x), i = 1; 2; :::; n, and the value functions V i only depend on the state x. Furthermore, the problem is symmetric and only symmetric equilibria are considered, so that the index i can be dropped for the functions V and h. Finally, it is assumed that the function h is continuously di¤erentiable and the function V is twice di¤erentiable. The dynamic programming or Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for each agent i becomes
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The optimality condition is
In equilibrium a i = h(x), so that
The dynamic programming or Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation becomes
By di¤erentiating (22) with respect to x, using the optimality condition (21) again and rearranging terms, a non-linear ordinary di¤erential equation in h(x) is obtained:
This equation is called the Euler equation (see Miranda and Fackler, 2002, p. 325-326) . The boundary condition is free which implies the multiplicity of feedback Nash equilibria. This can be also interpreted as an indeterminacy of the transversality conditions. Boundary conditions can be connected to the steady states x f of the feedback Nash equilbria in the following way:
The contours of the algorithm, that will be presented shortly, will be clear by now. Starting from a feasible steady state x f , the di¤erential equation (23) has a boundary condition (24) and can be solved, which yields a candidate feedback Nash equilibrium corresponding to that steady state.
Before specifying the functions and parameters in (23) and (24) according to the shallow lake problem, it is interesting to return for a moment to the linear-quadratic di¤erential game of international pollution control (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1992) , that was mentioned in the introduction. In that problem the utility and damage functions are both assumed to be quadratic
x 2 ), the internal feedbacks are assumed not to exist (f (x) = 0), and the number of countries n = 2. The di¤erential
with hyperbola as solutions, and the steady states are characterized by a
x, in the (x; h) space. This situation is depicted in Fig. 1 in Dockner and Long (1993) , as well as in Rubio and Casino (2002) .
The Shallow Lake Continued
The speci…cations for the shallow lake problem (U (a i ) = ln a i ; and
) turn the non-linear ordinary di¤erential equation (23) into
and the boundary condition (24) into
Equation (26) is an Abel di¤erential equation of the second kind (Murphy, 1960) , which cannot be solved analytically. In this paper the ode solver ode15s of Matlab is used to …nd a numerical solution of (26), with boundary condition (27) (see The MathWorks, 2002, Polyanin and Zaitsev, 1995) . In order to be able to make a comparison with the benchmark cases of optimal management and the open-loop Nash equilibrium in Section 2.1, the parameters are …xed at the same values as in Section 2.1: b = 0:6, = 0:03, c = 1 and n = 2. The parameter x f denotes the steady state of the feedback Nash equilibrium. According to the boundary condition (27), it must lie on the curve h(x) = 1 n (bx
) in the (x; h) plane, but it is otherwise free so that a multiplicity of Nash equilibria results. Note that h represents the individual loading, so that this curve denotes the steady states of the lake model (16) because total loading a = nh. Note that when the curve for the steady states of the lake model (16) in the (x; a) plane, a = bx
, is superimposed on the (x; h) plane, this curve represents the points at which singularities can be expected, because at these points the coe¢ cient of h 0 (x) in the di¤erential equation (26) is equal to 0.
As it was mentioned in the introduction, comparing steady states is one 
where h(x) is the solution of the di¤erential equation (26), with boundary condition (27), and x(t) is the solution of the di¤erential equation
It will be clear that in general not every steady state x f can be reached from any initial state x 0 . It will also be clear that in general not every steady state x f will be stable. If, however, a number of stable steady states can be reached from some initial state, it is assumed that the agents will be able to coordinate on the best feedback Nash equilibrium, if it exists. This means that in that case the value will be only a function of the initial state:
where x f must be reachable from x 0 and stable, and where it is assumed that the maximum exists.
The numerical algorithm to characterize the best feedback Nash equilbrium for the shallow lake problem consists of the following steps:
Step 1. For each candidate x f the non-linear ordinary di¤erential equa-tion (26) with boundary condition 27) is solved, with the ode solver ode15s
of Matlab, in the intervals [p; x f ] and [x f ; q], where p and q are chosen appropriately.
Step 2. The numerical solution for h(x) is then used to solve the transition equation (29) in the interval [0; T ], where T is chosen appropriately.
Step 3. Then the value (28) is computed, using a seven point GaussLaguerre quadrature formula.
Step 4. Finally, the set of values is maximized over the set of admissible
The results will also be presented in steps. At the end a comparison can be made with optimal management and the open-loop Nash equilibrium. 
Candidate feedback control strategies
), a steady state results that can be reached from the right but not from the left.
Insert Figure 4 here.
Region 3. For x f > 0:72, the pro…les of the solutions are given by Figure   5 . The solution extends backward until it meets the curve of singularities at an in…nite slope. The candidate steady states in this region are stable.
Insert Figure 5 here.
Best feedback Nash equilibrium
In Steps 2 to 4 of the numerical algorithm, the initial state x 0 has to be determined. In Region 1, only initial states are feasible that are smaller than the x-value of the intersection point of the pro…le, corresponding to the steady state x f = 0:17, with the curve of singularities. In Region 2, only initial states are feasible that are larger than the value of the unstable steady state of the …rst pro…le (x 0 = 0:17). In Region 3, only initial states are feasible that are larger than the x-value of the intersection point of the pro…le, corresponding to the steady state x f = 0:72, with the curve of singularities.
By combining these observations, it follows that only initial states are feasible that are larger than x 0 = 0:17.
This can be better explained with the help of …gure 6, which is an enlarged version of …gure 4 around x f = 0:38:
Insert Figure 6 here.
For 0:17 < x 0 < 0:38, pro…les can be chosen that start at the unstable steady state x 0 = x f on the curve of the steady states h(x) g s (x) =n = 1 n (bx
); which is the dashed line labeled SS, leading to a stable steady state x f on the curve SS between 0:38 and 0:72, or that start above that point (if possible) resulting in a higher stable steady state. The maximization in
Step 4 shows that it is best to choose the pro…le that starts at the unstable steady state. In …gure 6 this means that, with x 0 = 0:24; pro…les could start at the intersection of the vertical line through x 0 = 0:24: Intersection points of that vertical line with pro…les below A are not feasible because the dynamics is unstable, and by maximization it is best to choose point A on SS: This point is unstable and leads to a stable steady state at B as indicated by the arrows. For x 0 > 0:38 (point E in …gure 6), pro…les can be chosen that lead to a stable steady state above the initial state, or that lead to a stable steady state between 0:38 and the initial state. The maximization in
Step 4 shows that it is best to choose the pro…le that leads (from the right) to the stable steady state 0:38; which is the pro…le tangent to the curve of steady states, SS; at point E. it is best to choose the pro…le that starts on the curve of steady states
) at the point h (x 0 ) lying on the intersection of the vertical line through x 0 and the curve of steady states, like point A in …gure 6. However, when the strategies are reconsidered after some time has elapsed and the state has reached a point between x 0 and 0:38, say point x 0 0 ; it is best not to follow that same pro…le anymore but rather to switch down to the pro…le that starts on the curve h(x) = 1 n (bx
) at the point h x 0 0 .
Moreover, if the state moves beyond 0:38, it is best to switch down to the pro…le that leads the system back to the stable steady state 0:38. A way to resolve this time-inconsistency is reoptimizing the feedback Nash equilibrium over time. The resulting trajectory approximately follows the curve
) and then converges to the steady state 0:38. This implies that the steady state 0:38 is an important point. It is the steady state of the best feedback Nash equilibrium for initial states x 0 > 0:38, but also for initial states 0:17 < x 0 < 0:38 in case the reoptimization is applied. When these values are compared with the previous results of this section, the general conclusion for the international pollution control game (Dockner and Long, 1993) individual loading there is given by
This corresponds to the following relation between total loading a = nh and the state x:
Note that equation (32) ) is decreasing at this point. It follows that this pro…le cannot be the pro…le of the best feedback Nash equilibrium, because the last one must be tangent to this curve. Moreover, it follows that the steady state of the best feedback Nash equilibrium is the tangency point of a lower pro…le and is therefore larger than the best steady state of the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
It is still true that lowering the discount rate moves the steady state of the best feedback Nash equilibirum towards the steady state of optimal management. At …rst, the e¤ect of increasing the number of communities n is neutralized, so that the best steady state of the open-loop Nash equilibrium moves below the ‡ip point again, and then the story in the beginning of this section applies. However, for any …xed discount rate , the story works vice versa: increasing the number of communities n moves the steady state of the best feedback Nash equilibrium beyond the open-loop one.
Comparisons between the di¤erent outcomes have focused on steady states up to now but it is, of course, more important to look at the values V (x 0 ).
In
Step 4 of the numerical algorithm above, the value for the best feedback Nash equilibrium V f (x 0 ) is explicitly calculated. The same can be done for the values for optimal management V o (x 0 ) and for the open-loop Nash equilibrium V n (x 0 ). In Table 1 the results are presented for a number of values of the initial state x 0 (and for the original set of parameter values).
Insert Table 1 here The best feedback Nash equilibrium is generally performing worse than the open-loop Nash equilibrium, and therefore a fortiori worse than optimal management. Only in the neighbourhood of the steady states, the performance is about the same. This shows that focusing on steady states does not give the right picture. It cannot generally be concluded that, in this type of models, Nash equilibria have been found that support optimal management.
Conclusion
It is often not realistic to use linear models for natural systems in pollution control problems. This implies that it is necessary to be able to handle non-linear di¤erential games in analyzing pollution control problems with negative externalities or public bads. This paper provides a numerical solution procedure to derive feedback Nash equilibria for the shallow lake prob-24 lem, a typical example of a non-linear di¤erential game in environmental and resource economics.
The literature on linear-quadratic di¤erential games has shown that nonlinear feedback Nash equilbria exist with steady states that are close to the optimal management steady state. However, in this paper it is shown that for non-linear di¤erential games the steady state of the best feedback Nash equilibrium is not necessarily close to the optimal management steady state.
Moreover, this paper shows that even if these steady states are close, the value of the corresponding feedback Nash equilibrium is generally much worse than the value of optimal management.
The good news is that we can handle an important class of non-linear di¤erential games, but the bad news is that generally the best feedback Nash equilibrium does not support optimal management. More research is needed to get better insight into this complicated type of problems. 
